Argument and Identity Change in the Atlantic Security Community by Kitchen, Veronica
1 
 
Argument and Identity Change in the Atlantic Security Community 
Veronica M Kitchen 
 
This is the final submitted copy of the following article, for the purposes of open-access archiving. For 
accuracy, please cross-reference with the published version:  
 
Kitchen, Veronica M. "Argument and identity change in the Atlantic security community." Security 
Dialogue 40, no. 1 (2009): 95-114. 
 
Abstract: The Atlantic community shares more than just dependable expectations of peaceful 
change. It also shares a reflexive political community within which the members see their security as 
intertwined and have a sense that their community is worth preserving in and of itself. Existing 
accounts of the security community have identified the importance of renewed emphasis on the 
values community as a factor in preserving and expanding the security community after the Cold 
War. But debates at the end of the Cold War also turned on the question of what the allies would do 
together and what responsibilities they had to each other and to other states. I outline a discursive 
framework as well as a set of rhetorical strategies used by the community members which explain 
how they worked to maintain and change their community during debates about their mandate for 
co-operation. I apply this framework to the Atlantic community’s debates over common action 
during the Yugoslav wars. 
 
Security Community and Reflexive Political Community 
Fifty years after Karl Deutsch and his team articulated the liberal theory of security 
communities and applied it to the North Atlantic Area it is clear that the transatlantic relationship 
comprises much more than “dependable expectations of peaceful change” (Deutsch et al., 1957:5). 
The no-war community, within which states find using violent conflict against one another 
unthinkable, continues to expand to include the countries of Eastern Europe and possibly even 
Russia (Pouliot, 2007; Williams, 2007). The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, within which 
member states pledge to come to one another’s assistance in the event of an attack, has likewise 
grown to twenty-six countries. The NATO alliance forms the institutional core of the Atlantic 
Community—a reflexive political community of states which have, over time, come to see not only 
their security but also their destiny as intertwined. These three groups have overlapping but not 
identical membership, and each depends on the other to some extent. 
In this paper, I first establish that there is a necessary connection between the no-war 
community and the reflexive political community in the realm of security, and that this work is 
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properly situated in the theoretical literature about security communities. Next, I review the 
literature on change within security communities to see what it can tell us about change within the 
political community. I outline a discursive approach to show how the member states used rhetorical 
strategies within the context of existing discourse, then apply it to the transatlantic disagreements 
over the Yugoslav wars.  
At the heart of the transatlantic relationship is the “identity-based no-war community” 
(Waever, 1998:71) which moderates the anarchy of the international system to generate peaceful 
relations rather than a balance of power. Within the security community, the security dilemma no 
longer applies; that is, states no longer describe actions, such as military build-up by other states, as 
potential threats to their own security. Deutsch and his colleagues hypothesized that this occurred 
through a process of integration facilitated by the broad compatibility of major values, the capacity 
of states to respond to each other’s needs and messages quickly and well, their ability to predict each 
other’s behaviour accurately (Deutsch et al., 1957: 66-67). Together these generated a sense of 
community, defined by Deutsch as consisting of “mutual sympathy and loyalties”, “we-feeling”, 
“trust and mutual consideration”, and “partial identification in terms of self-images and interests” 
(Deutsch et al., 1957: 36).  Working within the constructivist tradition, Emanuel Adler and Michael 
Barnett hypothesized that dependable expectations of peaceful change developed when precipitating 
factors led states to increase their common security, then structural factors, such as a powerful state 
acting as an attractive pole, and procedural factors such as an increase in the quality and quantity of 
transactions and the development of institutions, ultimately led to the development of a common 
identity (Adler and Barnett, 1998:38). A security community is about one thing:  developing and 
maintaining expectations of peaceful change. Recent research suggests that, contra to Adler and 
Barnett’s hypothesis, it may not even depend on much of a common identity (Pouliot, 2007). But as 
Deutsch et al. noted in their original study, “men have often wanted more: they have wanted a 
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political community that would not merely keep the peace among its members but that would also 
be capable of acting as a unit in other ways and for other purposes” (Deutsch et al., 1957: 31). This 
seems intuitively right; states which share values and identities, trust and mutual consideration, 
common institutions and interact on a regular basis are likely to share much more than a no-war 
community. 
 As has become particularly clear since the end of the Cold War, the states of the Atlantic 
community see themselves as such a political community beyond the security community. Not only 
do they share dependable expectations of peaceful change, they see their security as intertwined, and 
seek to act together to preserve that security. I will not attempt here to enumerate a list of countries 
which are members of the Atlantic community. Suffice it to say that it is clearly not coterminous 
with the zone of dependable expectations of peaceful change in the Euro-Atlantic area (which may 
exclude, say, Greece and Turkey because of their fraught bilateral relationship, and include states like 
Sweden, Switzerland, and possibly even Russia) or with the North Atlantic Alliance (which does not 
uniformly see its security as entwined: would NATO’s Article 5 commitment really extend to a 
skirmish on the Russian-Georgian border, if Georgia becomes, as NATO has said it will, a NATO 
member?). But the Atlantic community defines a group of states geographically situated in the Euro-
Atlantic area, with a history of common interaction and common institutions, of which the most 
important is NATO, which shares common interests and a common identity and a self-conscious or 
reflexive sense that the community is worth maintaining. It is properly studied in the context of 
security community theory because the no-war community underlies the political community and 
differentiates it from an alliance, where security may be intertwined without a sense of common 
destiny or a self-consciousness about the intrinsic value of the community. A common identity may 
be unnecessary in all but the thinnest sense in a security community, but it is certainly necessary in a 
political community in the realm of security. The political community in the realm of security would 
4 
 
not be so strong without the underlying security community. Michael Williams has shown that the 
liberal content of the security community and the no-war democratic ideal provide a motivation for 
growing the community (Williams, 2007: 63). Similarly it provides the foundation for the identity-
based Atlantic community.  
What responsibility do the members of the Atlantic community have to each other, and what 
is the scope of their action together? This question has been the central one at many points in the 
history of the Atlantic community, at no point more so than at the end of the Cold War when the 
existence of the political community, the Alliance, and the no-war community were all in question. 
Ultimately this matter of responsibility is a question of identity: the question of ‘who we are 
together’ defines the question of what we do together. The existing literature on security 
communities, though it is concerned principally with developing and maintaining dependable 
expectations of peaceful change, provides some guidance for studying identity change in the political 
community. Change in the political community is change of a lesser degree than dissolution of the 
security community. The Atlantic community could dissolve without threatening the dependable 
expectations of peaceful change which constitute the security community. Change in the Atlantic 
community will be change in what it means to be a member of the community, without losing the 
reflexive sense that there is an Atlantic community. 
 Within the constructivist tradition, Thomas Risse argues that it is the domestic liberal 
democratic identity of the transatlantic states which led them to form “democratic international 
institutions whose rules and procedures are aimed toward consensual and compromise-oriented 
decision-making respecting the equality of the participants.” (see also Risse-Kappen, 1995:4-5; Risse-
Kappen, 1996:368). However, one cannot simply read domestic structures onto international 
structures. What matters is that the democracies of the Atlantic community argue that it is their 
democratic nature which matters to the structure of their international community. They could have 
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chosen some other point of identity; at the formation of the community, for instance, Christendom 
was still a popular concept in the Atlantic community. Indeed, to the extent that the Atlantic 
community overlaps with NATO, not all states were democracies through the entire Cold War. 
When they were not, as in the case of Portugal and Greece, the allies made arguments about why 
they were nonetheless part of the Atlantic Community.  
Risse suggests that the mechanism by which collective identities change is “truth seeking” 
and reasoned consensus (Risse, 2000:1). This, he argues, is most likely to occur when actors have to 
figure out what the situation is, which norms apply, or choose between conflicting rules. They work 
out whether their assumptions about the world are correct, and which norms are relevant. This 
means that at least one actor must be open to having its mind changed (Risse, 2000:6-7). However, 
Risse’s logic of argument depends on having some way of knowing when an actor has changed its 
mind because it has been persuaded by the better argument. It might also have changed it because 
doing so maximized utility (the logic of consequences) or because it was following a rule or norm 
(the logic of appropriateness). Moreover, when seeking agreement the allies are not, as Risse would 
have it, truth-seeking, but rather truth-creating. So the allies are not just looking for consensus based 
on which of a set of rules and norms drawn from a ‘common lifeworld’ apply (Risse, 2000:15), but 
rather actively creating that common lifeworld. Risse’s account does not necessarily preclude the idea 
that actors create truth and identity through argument. For instance, he argues that a socially 
constructed security community provides a common lifeworld. But as Krebs and Jackson have 
pointed out, we do not need to rely on persuasion, with its hard-to-study motives (Krebs and 
Jackson, 2007). Furthermore, as Janice Bially Mattern contends, there is plenty of evidence that 
power, and not persuasion, is at work in the development of security communities. 
Bially Mattern argues that it is by communicative exchange that personal opinions or 
observations about the world are turned into (potential) social facts, and through the process of 
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“verbal fighting” that a collective ‘truth’ is decided (Bially Mattern, 2005:597). Like other strands of 
security communities theory, Bially Mattern’s theory of international order focuses on identity. She 
holds that “identities are the products of authors who choose to inscribe the narratives that form and 
maintain them” (Bially Mattern, 2005:12) and that identity is a process, not a condition (Bially 
Mattern, 2005:50). Through the use of representational force, in which the wielder identifies and 
exploits contradictions in the victim’s various identities such that they are forced to uphold a 
particular identity for fear of losing their sense of Self, identity can be cemented through times of 
intense crisis. Bially-Mattern applies her theory of representational force to situations of disorder, 
what she calls “unsettled times”, where the relationship between two states in a security community 
has deteriorated to such a state that dependable expectations of peaceful change are at risk (Bially 
Mattern, 2005:31). However, she acknowledges that there are other strategies which may be in use in 
situations where they are not threatened (Bially Mattern, 2005:106).  Strategies such as tolerance, 
Risse’s persuasion above, and the ones I will describe below may be useful to maintain or change the 
community.  
Michael Williams also shows how after the Cold War, the allies re-wrote and mobilized their 
identity as guarantor of Western civilization. This gets close to the idea of the political community in 
the realm of security. He argues that visions for the future of the Alliance (the most important 
institution of the political community) emerged from the redefinition of security as cultural (rather 
than physical) security and the redefinition of threat to be from the lack of democratic structures 
rather than the balance of power (Williams, 2007: 74). Michael Williams reminds us that this does 
not always need to be the case. In his book, he argues that the states of the NATO alliance have 
disciplinary power over outsiders (and, by extension, powerful states within the Atlantic community 
have power over less powerful ones). As Williams puts it, “the call is for states inside—and 
especially outside—to recognize their true identities as part of a security community whose 
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principles are chosen and freely accepted, not dictated. The call is to return to, or move towards, 
what one really wants to be (and should want to be): a liberal-democratic state operating within the 
agreed rules and structures of the community” (Williams, 2007: 60). This disciplinary power is 
certainly power to maintain and change the community, but of a different order than forcing 
adherence to dependable expectations of peaceful change. This explanation underlies NATO 
enlargement, but can also be extended to underlie changes in the responsibilities states argued they 
had to one another and the scope of their action in the world.   
Also working in the Bourdieusian tradition, Vincent Pouliot provides a slightly different 
explanation for diplomacy and non-violence in security communities. He suggests that they are 
habits and part of common sense knowledge rather than based on interest or identity. This 
habitus—the historical, inarticulate, intersubjective knowledge held by elites in a security 
community—disposes them to resolve disputes non-violently (Pouliot, 2008). The habitus or 
background knowledge in turn determines the types of practices, or “meaningful patterns of socially 
recognized activity” deemed acceptable to the elites of a security community (Adler, 2008: 198). 
Within a security community, the relevant practice is something along the lines of “self-restraint” 
(Adler, 2008: 204). Crisis can occur, according to Bjola and Kornprobst, one state perceives another 
state’s practice to be incompatible with the habitus of the community, leading to disagreement about 
the collective identity (Bjola and Kornprobst, 2007: 286). The identity they refer to is quite clearly 
one that exists beyond the dependable expectations of peaceful change of the security community 
and helps to define the reflexive political community.      
This review of the literature on security communities gives us some clues as to what explains 
identity change in the Atlantic community. First, the link between the security community and the 
political community is not unimportant. It provides the background knowledge and habits which 
form the foundation for a reflexive community which acts together, and defines the range of logical 
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options. However, the political community, being conscious and reflexive rather than defined by 
habits, can be studied through political talk. Second, rhetorical action can be an important substitute 
for material action which does not depend on the use of force which is unthinkable in a security 
community. Third, moments of crisis or tension are important not just as times when dependable 
expectations of peaceful change may be threatened, but also as times when members of the 
community are engaged in the process of negotiating and re-negotiating the extent of their 
responsibility to each other and the boundaries of their common action.  
 
Analysing Identity Change 
Against the stable background of the mature security community, within the institutional 
context of NATO, identity change in the Atlantic community is best studied through public talk by 
security elites. This is so for a number of reasons. First, identity is reflexive and intersubjective. That 
is, it exists only as long as states consciously see themselves as having the Atlantic identity, and it 
exists in the relations between states (Jackson and Nexon, 2001: 8). The members of the Atlantic 
community construct their identity relationally and reflexively by defining what threatens them, by 
demarcating the geographical boundaries of their community, and by how they construct 
responsibility to each other and to third parties.1 They work these things out mostly in debate. 
Second, focusing on talk has the advantage that it does not rely on knowing the motivations of 
actors or being able to judge whether they have been persuaded (Krebs and Jackson, 2007: 36). 
Third, rhetorical action is not only a substitute for material force, per Bially Mattern’s argument, but 
also the principal realm of action where the community members work out their identity. Policy 
makers in particular connect identity and action, because their words have the authority to define 
policy (Hansen, 2006:28-29). In democracies in particular, policy makers are required to defend their 
                                                   
1 This framework is adapted from Lene Hansen’s useful one which suggests identity is constructed on the dimensions of 
space, time, and ethics (Hansen, 2006). 
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decisions before their citizens in order to be re-elected, thus public arguments will show their 
reasons and justifications for choosing a particular policy. These publically given reasons 
simultaneously construct the boundaries of community, because they define the scope and basis of 
co-operative action. This is true despite the fact that most of the substance of the transatlantic 
relationship occurs at a bureaucratic level and is rooted in personal and institutional relationships 
between policy makers and experts. Eventually, policies must be debated and justified in public.      
Public talk forms the structures, expressed through language, that condition what can and 
cannot legitimately be said, and how it can be said, in the public political sphere (Foucault, 
2002(1969):130-131). Discourse is important to the study of security communities because the 
creation of discursive structures is one of the ways community is constructed.2 A discourse can be 
seen as the set of rhetorical resources a speaker can reasonably draw on to make plausible-sounding 
statements. Discourse frames problems in particular ways, and makes possible certain kinds of 
arguments about policy while shutting out others. But discourses do not form identities simply by 
being in the air. Actors must mobilize these resources into reflexive arguments about their 
community and policy arguments about the kinds of actions they should take. By making 
legitimizing arguments about their preferred course of action, the allies come to consensus about 
action or they make decisions about how to behave in the absence of consensus. It is also through 
this process of argument that they change the discourse and their identity. Discourse is connected to 
behaviour because it legitimizes certain actions over others, and is linked to identity because it helps 
define appropriate behaviour for members of the community. 
Methodologically, a discursive analysis means that I looked at public statements made by 
foreign policy elites in states which are uncontroversially members of the Atlantic community: 
                                                   
2 There are also many objective, non-discursive ways that community is constructed: we visit each other, we work 
together, we construct tangible and intangible common institutions, we establish “many-sided and direct relations” 
(Adler and Barnett, 1998:32). Ultimately, however, these material facets of community matter because of the meanings 
we attach to them and the arguments we use to give them legitimacy as parts of our community.  
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American, British, French, and German officials with the authority to influence decision making 
directly, which were preferably widely covered in the media, and which contained clear statements 
about identity and policy (Hansen, 2006:82-87). This means that they were usually debates, 
interviews, speeches, or press conferences given by individuals rather than press releases or other 
statements written by the government. I looked for direct references to how the allies conceived of 
the Atlantic identity, what they expect of each other in their role as allies, and how they wish to 
change the community.  
 
Mechanisms for Change 
Discourse limits the range of things which can or cannot legitimately be said, and discursive 
change constitutes identity change. Actors uphold the Atlantic identity by making argument about 
what it means to be Atlantic, and what that identity means for how good allies behave. The 
constraints of discourse do not mean that community members do not behave strategically. 
Discourse limits what makes sense against the background of what has been said before, and the 
identity of the security community. Within this range of plausible arguments, policy makers choose 
the rhetorical strategy most likely to convince others (Schimmelfennig, 2003).  
International relations theorists have proposed a number of rhetorical mechanisms actors 
may use to change or maintain the community’s identity. Persuasion and representational force were 
discussed above. Patrick T. Jackson argues that short phrases called “rhetorical commonplaces” are 
drawn upon by policy makers to legitimize particular policies. These commonplaces constrain 
discourse because there are only a limited number in operation at a given time, restricting the way 
things can be said (Jackson, 2006:76). These claims to legitimacy cause social outcomes, argues 
Jackson, because giving reasons is part of a process of drawing and re-drawing social boundaries that 
creates actors as well as actions (Jackson, 2006:41). The mechanisms of specification (a vague 
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rhetorical commonplace is made more precise), breaking (one party highlights inconsistencies in 
another’s position), and joining (one party tries to undermine another’s position by linking its 
rhetorical commonplace to a different position) do the causal work of stabilizing an identity 
(Jackson, 2006: x).       
 Emanuel Adler refers instead to practices: “knowledge-constituted, meaningful patterns of 
socially recognized activity embedded in communities, routines, and organizations that structure 
experience”. Practices are not merely rhetorical action but encompass also the things actors do 
together, though they are not separate from discourse (Adler, 2008: 198). Adler argues that the 
practice of self-restraint defines the North Atlantic security community, and that shared values and 
norms alone will not sustain or grow a security community in the absence of shared practices (Adler, 
2008: 220). Indeed, as Deutsch noted in his original research, shared values do not seem to be 
particularly important for the development of a security community, as long as fundamental values 
are broadly shared (Deutsch et al., 1957: 66). 
 Here, I focus on one broad category of things actors do together: talk and debate. Adler 
describes the micro-mechanism sustaining the growth of a security community through the spread 
of background knowledge as changes in expectations and dispositions, developed through mutual 
engagement, defining what the community is about, and creating and breaking routines (Adler, 
2008:204). In the Atlantic community, a very large chunk of this work happens through public 
debate. Through public talk the members of the community sustain and change their identity 
through arguments about the kinds of threat they faced, about whether NATO should have a role in 
out-of-area interventions and what kinds of responsibilities they had to each other and to third 
states. At the same time, they are overwhelmingly concerned with maintaining the political 
community in the face of dispute.   The argumentative strategies I outline here are not exhaustive, 
but rather examples. They explain outcomes because they help to shape discursive structures 
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(Jackson, 2006:41)which, in turn, constrain the range of policy options which make sense 
(Schimmelfennig, 2003).  
Certainly the members of the community use rhetorical commonplaces in the way Jackson 
describes, in particular to extend the frame of their debates. Jackson discusses specification, whereby a 
vague rhetorical commonplace is made more precise within a specific policy debate (Jackson, 
2006:44). Extending the frame works in a similar way. The way a policy is framed is important 
because it may influence the direction of debate. If a policy maker looking for support for a 
potentially contentious policy can situate that policy within an existing frame; that is, if he can draw 
upon phrases and arguments which already have resonance within the community, he may be able to 
connect a new policy to well established ones. This is a technique useful for maintaining the 
continuity of the community in the face of changing circumstances. New ideas are rendered like old 
ones.     
The members of the community have also used the strategy of grand design. Unlike extending 
the frame, which seeks to situate policy arguments within existing frameworks emphasizing sameness, 
grand design is a technique designed to change the discourse through rhetorical innovation which 
builds on discursive structures and adds to the rhetorical resources available to policy elites making 
arguments. To be sure, a grand design cannot be plucked from the air, independent of all other ideas 
in the community. As with all other arguments, it must make sense in the context of existing 
discursive structures. But they do tend to offer a fairly comprehensive vision of the community 
designed to reinvigorate it or move it in radically new directions. Examples from the Atlantic 
community include NATO itself, Kennedy’s Grand Design, Charles de Gaulle’s grandeur, Kissinger’s 
Year of Europe, and so on. At the end of the Cold War, members of the community proposed 
various visions for the post-war Atlantic architecture, but not all of them survived the when faced 
with rapidly unfolding events on the ground. When grand designs are articulated, they provide a 
13 
 
framework onto which new policies can be joined and new ways in which an identity can be 
produced and reproduced. In the Atlantic community, grand designs have frequently been attempted 
when the allies are dissatisfied with the status quo of alliance relations, or when global changes (such 
as the end of the Cold War) force a reconsideration of the boundaries of community. As a rhetorical 
strategy, grand design may highlight not just a grand vision but also points of contention within the 
community and provide a way for allies to discuss them in the abstract. Even if an entire grand 
design does not get translated into policy, it may provide the rhetorical material for the creation of 
new concepts or ideas which may shape discursive structures in the future.  
Finally, community members use the rhetorical strategy of legitimizing dissent to repair the 
community when it is strained because of a dispute between members that threatens the reflexive 
community, though not the dependable expectations of peaceful change. Unlike the mechanisms of 
rhetorical force, breaking and joining identified by Bially Mattern and Jackson, it does not seek to 
undermine an opponent’s position but rather to accommodate it without harming the community. It 
is a variant of extending the frame above, in that it emphasizes sameness, but works specifically by 
transforming a perceived weakness (public disagreement over policy) into a strength. Other 
members of the community build discursive structures which bind the community together in spite 
of the dispute or even if one member is not actively producing and reproducing the community. At 
various points throughout the history of the Atlantic community, such as when France withdrew 
from NATO’s integrated command, and during the Iraq war crisis of 2003, policy elites argued that 
their propensity to public argument and even crisis demonstrated the democratic nature of their 
community. Legitimizing failure, similarly, works to maintain the political community when it has 
failed to act or has acted in ways which are inconsistent with its identity. 
 




 By the end of the Cold War, it was clear that the security community in the North Atlantic 
area had been supplemented by a reflexive political community in the realm of security. From the 
early 1980s the members of the community argued that the maintenance of the community was an 
end in itself. The destruction of the community itself was consistently presented as a threat.  
 Karin Fierke shows how at the end of the Cold War NATO’s survival was related to the way 
it argued for its continued relevance (Fierke, 1998: 173). NATO tried to lay down the rules for its 
survival, but because the alliance did not act in a vacuum, the decisions and manoeuvres of other 
actors also influenced the outcomes of its actions. NATO was forced to take particular actions 
because it was also constrained by arguments that had been made before. The Alliance was 
portrayed as the victor in the ideological war, and dissidents in Eastern Europe were portrayed as 
allies sharing their ideals. Finally, after so many years of arguing that Eastern Europe’s captive 
peoples were part of Europe, they were no longer captive, and it was difficult to justify not 
extending the community to include them. This is a classic example of the strategy of extending the 
frame.  The West had won, and had to take this rare third chance to get Europe right by preparing 
NATO and Europe for the future (Bush, 1989; Christopher, 1994a, 1994b; Dumas, 1990; Genscher, 
1988; Thatcher, 1988). 
 This new mission of socialization, argues Fierke, implied political expansion though not 
necessarily military expansion, which NATO initially resisted (Fierke, 1998: 174). However, the 
countries of Eastern and Central Europe became suspicious and articulated their hope that the 
political dialogue would eventually lead to membership in the Alliance. The Partnership for Peace 
became a way for NATO to navigate a middle course between the fear of mobilizing Russian 
nationalism and the pressure from Eastern European states to which NATO members had already 
articulated a responsibility, all without the necessity of enlarging the Alliance. However, as Fierke 
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shows, the Partnership for Peace gave momentum to those arguing for expansion, and eventually it 
became not only thinkable, but inevitable (Fierke, 1998: 173-180). As enlargement proceeded, the 
NATO allies also needed to signal to Russia that it was not hostile. This, says Fierke, forced NATO 
to rethink its commitment to collective defence (Fierke, 1998: 186). Expansion became necessary to 
ensure NATO’s survival, but at the same time it weakened the Article 5 collective defence 
provisions of the Alliance: if the European allies doubted the Americans would sacrifice New York 
to save Berlin, it was even more doubtful in the case of Budapest (Fierke, 1998: 207).  
 Fierke does not pursue this point to examine the implications of the post-Cold War identity 
shift for the political community and for the way the members of the community chose to act 
together beyond mutual defence. As the members of the Atlantic community negotiated the 
boundaries of their action together they likewise found that their grand designs floundered in the 
face not just of events on the ground, but disputes among themselves.       
 
Identity Change and the Bosnian War  
 This process of identity change and boundary redefinition was clearly in evidence during the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia, when the allies were forced to decide how far their responsibility to their 
Eastern European and Balkan neighbours extended. The dynamics outlined by Williams and Fierke 
above set the stage for the preservation of the Atlantic security community and its continued 
transformation as a reflexive political community in the realm of security. The survival of NATO 
and the socialization of Central and Eastern Europe into the West led to an emphasis on the values 
community; the wars in Yugoslavia solidified a mandate for the political community of states which 
wished to act together for crisis management and humanitarian aid. The Atlantic (security) identity at 
this moment was not strategized solely strategized in grand design, but hashed out by community 
members in the creation of particular policies in reaction to pressing problems on the ground.  
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 The process of adapting Yugoslavia’s economic and political structures after the end of the 
Cold War was fraught. Economic difficulties, a desire for autonomy by the constituent governments 
of the federation, and increasingly strident attempts by the Serbs to dominate the federation were 
compounded by the problem of dealing with national minorities in the republics. Several rounds of 
constitutional debates did not produce a solution. The instability in Yugoslavia was not a territorial 
threat on the same scale as Soviet troops coming across the Fulda Gap, but certainly unrest in the 
‘Balkan Powderkeg’ at a time of transition and fragility in Russia put European countries on alert. 
Deutsch suggests that foreign threat plays little role in security community building (Deutsch et al., 
1957: 45), but even if it did, discourse of the time suggests that this was not the primary reason for 
action by the members of the community. 
By the end of the Cold War, conflict in Southeastern Europe had been redefined as conflict 
in Europe, and thus the instability brought with it reminders of Europe’s past, and the urge to do 
something, especially as human rights came to be seen as more and more important in the narrative 
of the transatlantic identity.3 The killing in Yugoslavia had to be stopped not because it posed a 
direct threat to European or transatlantic security (though it did pose an indirect one), but rather 
because it posed a threat to Atlantic sensibilities and the narrative of the values-based identity 
The Yugoslav crisis was not initially seen as a transatlantic issue for the Atlantic Community 
to solve. Instead it was seen as an opportunity to test the grand designs of the post-Cold War 
security architecture. Initially, it was hoped that the Conference for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe’s new conflict resolution mechanisms could be put to the test, proving the CSCE as the best 
design for post-war security in Europe. This was not to be, and the European Communities were 
the next to try to solve the crisis in Yugoslavia. Success would have been a victory for the grand 
design of the fledgling Common Foreign and Security Policy encompassed in the 1992 Maastricht 
                                                   
3 See, for example: (Bush, 1989; Genscher, 1988; Juppé, 1994b). 
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Treaty on European Union. France in particular favoured a grand design which would show that 
Europe could deal with its own crises when the United States could not or would not participate 
(Tardy, 1999). The Germans, newly unified, supported European mechanism for intervention, but 
they had to balance the moral conviction that intervention was the right thing to do and the need to 
show their allies that they could have a normal foreign policy with the domestic prohibitions on 
deploying troops abroad and a perceived history as an aggressor in the Balkans (Libal, 1997; Maull, 
1996). The British tended to see the conflict as a civil war and were not disposed to intervention; on 
the other hand, they did not want Americans to have to intervene in a conflict in Europe’s backyard 
('United Nations Operations (25 Sept),' 1992). Such a grand design met American interests as well: 
the long-standing desire for burden-sharing could finally be fulfilled. Early and efficient European 
action could “demonstrate that not every crisis need become a choice between inaction and 
unilateral American intervention”  (Christopher, 1993). 
Unfortunately, Europeans themselves could not agree on the scope of their co-operation 
abroad, and it soon became clear that the European security architecture was too new to manage the 
conflict. NATO became progressively more involved. The fighting was at its worst in Bosnia, where 
continued fighting, ethnic cleansing, and hostage taking led to an intense debate on the use of air 
power as a tool of coercive diplomacy to force the warring parties to peace talks. The United 
Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) had a mandate to protect humanitarian aid delivery on the 
ground, and from 1993, NATO agreed to launch air strikes at the behest of the UN under a ‘dual 
key’ scenario, but there was little political will to actually do it.  
The Americans, skittish about committing ground troops to Yugoslavia for various reasons 
including the violent death of 18 American soldiers during the October, 1993 Battle of Mogadishu, 
publically ruled their use. The policy of ‘lift-and-strike’—lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian 
Muslims, and striking Serbian positions—gained prominence in official Washington if not public 
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support from the newly elected President Bill Clinton. The Americans continued to expect 
European states to take a leadership role (Gow, 1997: 95). For their part, the British and the French 
argued that the use of air strikes would threaten the delivery of humanitarian aid. Here the 
Europeans had the moral high ground, because it was their troops which anchored UNPROFOR. 
At least they were actually ‘doing something’, while the Americans were merely talking.4 Britain and 
France used the threat of extracting UNPROFOR to prevent the United States Congress from 
lifting the arms embargo and beginning air strikes. The French and British repeatedly proclaimed 
that a decision to lift the arms embargo would end UNPROFOR, because their forces could not 
stay in the former Yugoslavia as the fighting inevitably escalated with the influx of arms.5 While the 
British referred to a policy of “lift and pray”, the French called it “lift and withdraw” (Juppé, 1994a). 
The situation deteriorated through 1994, as did relations between the transatlantic allies as 
they tried to work out what to do. In November of that year, the United States ceased to enforce the 
arms embargo and stopped sharing information about arms shipments with its allies. NATO began 
to make plans to extract UNPROFOR in case the embargo was lifted. A ceasefire negotiated by 
former American President Jimmy Carter held over the winter of 1994/1995, but broke in the 
spring. Bosnian Croat and Bosnian forces in Bosnia, who were receiving covert assistance from the 
Americans, began to make significant territorial gains, while Bosnian Serbs were weakening. Bosnian 
Serbs took UN peacekeepers hostage, humiliating the member countries of UNPROFOR who had 
done little to protect UN-designated safe areas and who could barely protect themselves. Despite 
threats of air strikes (and the occasional actual strikes), the Bosnian Serbs began to attack safe areas. 
In July of 1995, Bosnian Serb forces took control of the city of Srebrenica, which was full of 
refugees fleeing ahead of their attacks. Dutch forces handed over about thousands of refugees in 
                                                   
4 See the following debates in the British House of Commons: ('Foreign Affairs and Defence Debate (17 
November),' 1994; 'Former Yugoslavia (9 May),' 1995). 
5 See Douglas Hurd’s comments: ('Former Yugoslavia (9 May),' 1995). 
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return for the release of 14 Dutch peacekeepers, and then retreated from the area after negotiations 
between the UN and the Bosnian Serbs. The Bosnian Serbs massacred somewhere around 7000 
men and boys over the next few days. This was the last straw—the allies faced threats to their 
troops, obviously, but could also not maintain their Atlantic identities acting to protect Yugoslav 
civilians. 
The Yugoslav crisis may have been only an Article 4 mission for NATO, but it became seen 
as a threat to NATO credibility6 and a test for the ability of the Atlantic Community’s institutions of 
collective security to nurture democracy and prevent ethnic cleansing (Christopher, 1993). The war 
in Bosnia became a crisis for the community when something they had identified as a vital interest—
the preservation of the community—was under threat. Inaction in Bosnia would be not just a threat 
to the alliance, its credibility and its ability to act in a post-Cold War world, but also a threat to the 
identity the Atlantic allies had constructed based on liberal democratic values. NATO was more 
important than Bosnia.7 No one would push the transatlantic dispute so far as to threaten the 
political community or the institution, both of which were integral parts of Atlantic identity. 
The rhetoric of responsibility and common values they used both justified the survival of the 
Atlantic community and ultimately led them to a situation where they had to act in order to maintain 
the identity of that community. They finally did when NATO launched Operation Deliberate Force 
at the end of August, 1995. Soon the passive definition of responsibility as socialization became a 
more active definition of responsibility as intervention, because the new post-war Atlantic identity 
would be untenable otherwise. The community members effectively re-defined the scope of their 
action together—to include military intervention beyond their borders—in order to stop the erosion 
of the community’s identity, and to protect its credibility for the future. If the allies did not find a 
new mandate for NATO, the primary institution of the Atlantic community, there would be no 
                                                   
6 See Patrick Cormack’s comments in: ('Former Yugoslavia (9 May),' 1995). 
7 See Menzies Campbell’s comments in: ('Former Yugoslavia (9 May),' 1995). 
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reason for it to exist. The values community sustained the Alliance, but that pillar of the alliance’s 
identity also forced a re-definition of the scope of action due to the responsibility that the allies had 
historically constructed to Eastern Europe.  
Policies cannot be read directly from identity, but in this case it seems as if the transatlantic 
states forced themselves into a position where they had to act, or lose something of themselves. This 
was not Bially Mattern’s representational force in the sense that one member of the community 
threatened another’s sense of self, but the Atlantic community members faced a similar imperative. 
If they did not act to change identity or policy, they would face the death of the Atlantic 
community—although not necessarily the dependable expectations of peaceful change.  
The mechanism of legitimizing dissent was active in the Bosnian crisis. When members of 
the American Congress were threatening to lift the arms embargo and President Clinton’s 
administration could not agree with other allies on whether or not to introduce American ground 
forces, the French Foreign Minister stressed the difficulties of the domestic American situation—
such as the defeat of the Democrats in Congress in November (Juppé, 1994c). The challenge for 
everyone, he said, was to act before Congress did. When the Atlantic community members finally 
did agree on air strikes after the massacre at Srebrenica, the British, like the French, portrayed it as 
the Americans coming in from the cold, celebrating their ultimate agreement rather than their 
previous dissent.8 The Germans and the Americans justified the policy reconciliation by emphasizing 
the need for American leadership in the world. If stability was in the vital interest of the Atlantic 
community, American involvement was necessary (Christopher, 1995a; Rühe, 1995). 
The strategy of legitimizing dissent allowed the Atlantic community members to paper over 
their dispute. However, they were still left with the damage done to their community because of 
their prolonged inactivity before finally acting decisively in 1995 to bring the parties to the war to the 
                                                   
8 See Malcolm Rifkind’s comments: ('Foreign Affairs Debate (16 November),' 1995). 
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peace table. By this point, the preservation of the Atlantic community had become an end in itself, 
listed as a primary interest in Bosnia along with restoring stability and delivering aid. It was necessary 
for them to take action to retain the credibility of their institutions and relationship by legitimizing 
failure.  They hedged their bets by arguing that this was, ultimately, not a crisis for their institutions. 
When the European Community/Union initiatives failed, Alain Juppé argued that this was not a 
failure of the CFSP, because the CFSP did not yet exist and as such was not tested. Had the 
capability to act been there, the Atlantic alliance would not be in this situation: “les moyens donnent 
la volonté” (means create will) (Juppé, 1993). Later, Minister of Defence Volker Rühe argued that 
the Bosnian crisis was not evidence of the failure of the CFSP, but rather evidence for its urgent 
necessity (Rühe, 1995). The allies also argued that while the CSCE, NATO, the EC, and the UN had 
not performed as well as everyone had hoped during this crisis, they had still tried to succeed – and 
often performed better than they ever had.9 They argued that this was a crisis about Bosnia, and not 
about NATO; that the crisis did not mean that NATO was invalid or no longer useful.10 Having 
argued that the Atlantic alliance and its institutions must remain intact for the preservation of the 
security of member states and to bring the benefits of the Alliance to the rest of Europe, the 
Atlantic governments faced a dilemma when it looked as if they would not be able to live up to that 
vision of their community. Preserving the vision by preserving the institutions, and by distancing the 
crisis from them (both practically, to solve the problem, as in the creation of the Contact Group, but 
also rhetorically) was a way to allow the allies to tell the same stories about their identities in the 
future. Thus there was no straightforward line between a sense of victory at the end of the Cold 
War, the ensuing responsibility to Eastern Europe, the new narrative of a values-based identity, and 
NATO’s intervention in Yugoslavia. It was, instead, a conversation about how the members of the 
community should act together.   
                                                   
9 See: (Christopher, 1995b; 'Former Yugoslavia (9 May),' 1995; Mitterrand, 1994). 





The Atlantic community is more than a security community. Its members are engaged in a 
positive political project in which they see their security as intertwined and a necessity for common 
action. The security community provides the foundation for this political community, which would 
not have the strength it does or the drive to common action without the security community. The 
task at the end of the Cold War was not just maintaining dependable expectations of peaceful 
change, but also seeking new arguments for continuing to act together. As others have noted, the 
necessary emphasis of the values community at the end of the Cold War pushed community 
members to expand their security community, but also to find ways to continue to act together 
beyond mutual defence. 
While the identity of the Atlantic community provided the impetus and some broad 
guidelines for action, it did not provide policy prescriptions for action. A checklist of attributes of 
the Atlantic identity is usefully ambiguous. It would include the common values of democracy, 
justice, and the rule of law. Because these concepts are not easily defined in a consistent, hard and 
fast way, they can be drawn upon to extend the frame, legitimize dissent, and generate grand 
strategies, and thus change discourse and identity. With the main pillars of the Atlantic community 
so vaguely defined, it is necessary to move down one level of abstraction to see how the allies make 
arguments about the expectations they have of each other in the abstract, and more importantly, in 
particular situations when they are trying to come to common policies.  
Common values do not constitute an identity if they are latent. Actors must argue that they 
matter. The reflexive consciousness about the value of the community turns out to be more 
important than the list of attributes. If the allies argue that their community is normatively valuable 
and worth preserving, they will seek interpretations of their identity that allow them to find common 
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ground and preserve it. Identity is worked out in the particular, drawing on ambiguous concepts. 
When the allies faced disagreements, they could always refer back to the pillars of common values 
and mutual defence which kept them together, finding particular ways of expressing the identity all 
could agree on, even if they had different policies.  
The Atlantic identity is not a monolithic or unchanging social construct. It must be 
constantly articulated and re-articulated, and in doing so actors are truth-creating rather than 
revealing some latent structure. Focusing on public arguments puts the focus squarely on agents. 
The arguments that members about the threats they face, the responsibility they have to one 
another, and the scope of their action together make can nudge the identity of the community in 
particular directions, and rule out certain actions. Policy makers and other constructors of 
community are the agents of change within the constraints of the decisions they (or other actors 
before them) have made earlier.  
The fact that identity is both ambiguous and actively constructed by agents means that it is 
sometimes used strategically.11 The Atlantic identity can not only change over time, but it can also 
support many different policy positions. To argue “we are states who support democracy” can lead 
to many different policy positions, just as arguing “we are not communists” can mean that we are 
many different things. As I argued above, the allies have an interest in not destroying their 
community, and will not interpret the identity in ways that threaten it. To say that identity is used 
strategically does not mean that it is always used violently to prevent a state from altering the status 
quo, or to threaten the identity of another state which has stopped arguing the accepted tenets of the 
community’s identity. Rhetoric is not merely powerfully destructive, but can be powerfully 
constructive as it was at the end of the Cold War.  This does not mean that states are unlimited in 
their actions and arguments. They are constrained by their own identities and by the discourses of 
                                                   
11 See (Bially Mattern, 2001) for another account of the strategic use of identity. 
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the community (Schimmelfennig, 2003). But a focus on identity does not preclude attention to state 
interests; actors will do the best they can to maximize their interests within the confines of their 
identities which, while changeable, are not instantly malleable.  
 As the security community has held strong and even grown in the North Atlantic area the 
political community of states which believes it should act together has changed rapidly. As the 
Atlantic community faces continued challenges in determining the scope of its actions together and 
the responsibilities its members have to one another, this framework can be used to explain how 
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